The Lisbon approach to on-street parking management

Soft Enforcement

Helsinki, September 20th, 2012
João Caetano Dias
# On Street Parking Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who receive income from On-Street?</th>
<th>Who receive income from Enforcement?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Authorities</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public or Private Company</td>
<td>Central Government</td>
</tr>
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### Alignment of Incentives

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Who enforces</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Police</th>
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First Portuguese Concession

- Income from on street divided between city and private.
- Enforcement to be made exclusively by Police at a local level.
- Income from enforcement divided by government and Police central organization.
First Concession Complete Mismatch

- Concessionaire received 0.
- City received 0.
- Space was occupied, unavailable to other drivers.
- Enforcers received 0 and dislike the activity.
- Driver had a very low probability of paying a fine to the Government.
Police didn’t like to enforce

- Low dignity activity.
- No incentives for local police departments.
- Citizens frown upon vigilance activity.
- Enforcers accused to work on behalf of private companies.

Average Payment: 2€
Fine: 60€ – 90€
Probability of being fined: <1%
Expected value of non compliance: 1,25€
Who is he?

- Someone with no coins in his wallet?
- An old man going to buy urgent medicine?
- Someone distracted?
- A millionaire soccer player having lunch in a fancy restaurant?
- Someone who refuses to pay for parking, always take a chance?
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Goal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Concessionaire received 0.</td>
<td>The driver owes money to the concessionaire, not to the government. A debt is generated.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Space was occupied, unavailable to other drivers.</td>
<td>All occupied spaces must generate revenue.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Enforcers received 0 and dislike the activity.</td>
<td>Enforcement job should be made more attractive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver had a very low probability of paying a fine to the Government.</td>
<td>Driver should have a high probability of paying the ‘debt’ to the concessionaire.</td>
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<td>Fines are unfair in many situations</td>
<td>Penalty should be proportional to the “crime”.</td>
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</table>
Why soft?

- No clamps, no fines.
- Acceptable values.
- Ask politely – you owe us.
- No menaces.
- Easy pay system.
Who enforces?

- Soft Enforcement is made by people who’s job is to enforce.
- Hard enforcement remains with Police or authorized public entities.
What if.... same License Plate is caught second time?

- Ask politely, again... for the double. You didn’t pay, twice. Show dates and ask for cumulated debt.
- Still no menaces.
What if … same license plate is found third time?

- Ask politely, again… for the triple.
- Alert for consequences…
- After a limit is reached, call hard enforcement authority.
Police reaction to the proposed system:

• No more chasing of unlucky drivers.
• No more check parking time on display.
• No more insults from citizens.
• Feel comfortable to act against persistent offenders – that’s their job!
Other characteristics of the system:

- After debt payment, at any time, records are clean.
- If authorities don’t answer request for hard enforcement, debt will keep increasing.
- Black lists available.
- When police acts, drivers may pay not only the fine, but also outstanding debt. If they don’t pay, record is not clean.
- Strong statistical data base for every street of the city.
- GPS control of enforcers.
- Automatic on-line requests for authorities.
Citizen reaction to the proposed system was very good.

- The alerts system is seen as an additional payment method sometimes called post-payment.
- Don’t need to worry if time expired or no coins available.
- Very low level of complaints.
- Easy acceptance of the amounts asked.
The system was implemented in Lisbon in June 2005, by EMEL, the public operator of Lisbon.

Soft enforcement made by private company.

Hard enforcement made by EMEL (clamp, tow away, fines).
## Lisbon Example

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Income more than doubled, only 3 months after start-up.

Currently 15,000 spaces operated with SIAF.

Crew of 100 soft enforcers from Private Company

10 teams of hard enforcement from EMEL, 3 Tow Away vehicles.
Incompliance levels reduced to less than 5%.

Recovery levels accounts for only 8% of the income.

Hard enforcement needed for less than 1% of the occurrences.

Very low complaint level (less than 1% of payment requests, 0.3% accepted).

EMEL received an EPA award for the Lisbon On-Street Management System.
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